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I.

INTRODUCTION

Tax scholars and government policy makers are giving serious
consideration to a shift from the current income tax to a consumption
1
tax. Even if there were agreement that a consumption tax was
superior to an income tax, however, there would still be significant
obstacles to accomplishing the shift.
This Article discusses probably the most significant obstacle to
the adoption of a consumption tax: the negative effects on existing
wealth that the transition from the income tax to most forms of a
consumption tax would have. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) in its 1997 study analyzed the question of “how to get there
2
from here.” The difficulty with transition and the changes in the tax
1

See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 151–90 (2005) [hereinafter
GROWTH AND INVESTMENT PROPOSAL] (proposing two Internal Revenue Code
(Code) reform options, one of which is entitled the Growth and Investment Tax
Plan); see also Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not
Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax]
(asserting that the current income tax system has already evolved into an income taxconsumption tax hybrid, leaning toward the consumption tax side); Daniel S.
Goldberg, E-Tax: Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition to a Currency-Free
Economy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 1, 11–17 (2000) [hereinafter Goldberg, E-Tax].
2
CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE TAX
REFORM (1997) [hereinafter CBO STUDY] (analyzing the major economic effects of
several tax reform plans).
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law since the CBO study, however, prompt the more basic question:
“Can we get there from here?” This Article deals with this question
by examining the effects of transition on existing wealth under a
variety of consumption tax systems and the likely responses of
transition relief under each of the systems. The consumption tax
proposals considered and analyzed include direct consumption taxes
(like a consumed income tax and yield exemption tax), indirect
consumption taxes (like a retail sales tax and various forms of value
added taxes), and combinations of the two (like the Flat Tax, X Tax,
and E Tax proposals), which involve a two-tier tax structure.
Part II of the Article describes the four basic methods of
operating a consumption tax and the effects of the adoption of each of
these methods on existing wealth. They are (1) a consumed income
tax, (2) a value added tax (VAT), which could take the form of a
subtraction method VAT, a credit invoice VAT, or a retail sales tax
(RST), which is analytically equivalent to a VAT, (3) a two-tier
consumption tax based on a VAT, and (4) a yield exemption tax.
Legislative proposals have sometimes blended two or more of these
approaches. Such a blended approach was taken in the recent Growth
and Investment (GIT) Plan of the President’s Advisory Panel on
3
Federal Tax Reform.
Taxes are characterized based upon legal incidence of the tax (i.e.,
who bears the legal obligation to pay the tax), even if the economic
incidence of the tax (i.e., who ultimately bears the burden of the tax)
falls on someone else. Thus, taxes can be characterized as either
direct taxes or indirect taxes. The consumed income tax and yield
exemption tax are direct consumption taxes, because the tax is
imposed directly on the individual taxpayer. The subtraction method
VAT, credit invoice VAT, and retail sales tax are indirect
consumption taxes, because the tax is imposed on the seller of goods
and services, even though it may ultimately be paid by the individual
taxpayer. Because a retail sales tax and a VAT raise identical issues,
the retail sales tax will be included in the VAT discussion. A two-tier
consumption tax based on a VAT is largely an indirect tax, with a
direct tax component for wage earners.
As a general proposition, a consumption tax in the form of either
a consumed income tax or a VAT reduces the tax on newly invested
4
capital to zero. In contrast, a consumption tax in the form of a yield

3

GROWTH AND INVESTMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 1.
Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a
Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 539 (1998).
4
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exemption tax reduces the tax on all capital — including existing
5
capital — to zero. The difference, then, is in the treatment of existing
or “old” capital. This important proposition, as well as its significance
for purposes of transition, will be explained in Part II.
In addition, these consumption tax alternatives may differ in their
macro-economic effects, that is, their effects on price levels, wage
levels, interest rates, and the time it would take for all of these effects
to work their way through the economy. These considerations are
important in choosing a replacement tax system as well as transition
considerations and are dealt with in Part III.
Transition relief for existing wealth is certain to be considered in
any serious proposal for fundamental change to a consumption tax.
The transition issues that arise in the shift from the income tax to each
of these forms of consumption tax are closely related and in many
respect the same, but the mechanisms by which they operate differ
depending upon the legal incidence of the form chosen. Part IV
discusses transition relief issues.
Part V and VI of the Article addresses the implications of the
foregoing analysis on the form of the consumption tax chosen and the
prospects for change in the current landscape. Finally, an Appendix
containing a simple numerical example is included in this Article in
order to make the theoretical discussion of principles more concrete.
II. METHODS OF ACHIEVING A CONSUMPTION TAX AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON EXISTING WEALTH
A. The Consumed Income Tax
One way to measure personal consumption is to begin with a
taxpayer’s income and then subtract savings or increase in wealth.
Income is generally defined for economic purposes as a taxpayer’s (1)
personal consumption during the year plus (2) increase in wealth
6
during the year. As such, the tax base in an income tax would
generally encompass both of those elements. By subtracting savings
from income, the resulting tax base would capture only a taxpayer’s
personal consumption. In that manner, the tax would be levied
7
directly on consumption. This model of the consumption tax is
5

Id. at 540.
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
7
See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). Under Andrews’s formulation, a taxpayer
would also include borrowings in his tax base and deduct repayments.
6
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sometimes referred to as the “cash flow consumed income tax” or
8
simply the “consumed income tax.”
The consumed income tax would be computed and collected at
9
the individual level. The taxpayer would include all income, both
from labor and from capital, and borrowing, and then subtract
10
savings.
The amount remaining after the subtraction would
11
constitute the taxpayer’s consumption and be subject to the tax.
Thus, for example, an individual who saves $10,000 from his $100,000
12
income for the year would only be taxed on his net of $90,000.
Under Professor Andrews’s original proposal, the tax base would
include borrowing, as indicated above, although the analysis differs
somewhat for commercial and consumer loans. Commercial loans
would be treated as income in the year received, with repayments of
13
interest and principal deductible when paid.
However, because
commercial loans are often taken out for capital investments (which
are deductible under the consumed income tax), the inclusion of the
commercial loans in income would not result in significantly larger tax
14
payments in the year of the loan. Consumer loans could also be
included in income as a way of dealing with negative savings, but the
same consumption tax effect could be achieved by excluding the
consumer loan from current tax and including repayments of the
consumer loan as taxable consumption expenditures, the only

8

Id. at 1120. The consumed income tax was originally proposed by William
Andrews, a Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, in a 1974 Law Review
article published in the Harvard Law Review. That article is generally regarded as the
genesis for serious thinking about the consumption tax as a replacement for the
income tax.
9
See generally id. at 1120. If only an individual level tax were imposed, then
individuals would be subjected to a tax on their pro-rata share of their business
entities’ business level consumed income in a manner similar to the current Code’s
subchapter K addressing partnerships.
10
Id. at 1149.
11
Id.
12
Administratively, this type of consumption tax is problematic since a method
must be devised to establish the amount of a taxpayer’s savings. The likely solution
would be to designate qualified accounts at savings banks, security brokerage houses,
and other types of financial institutions to track these savings. See, e.g., Paul H.
O’Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Description and Explanation of the Unlimited Savings
Allowance Income Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1522 (Mar. 10, 1995) (describing
the type of form which would be used to keep track of savings and investments).
13
Andrews, supra note 7, at 1153.
14
Id. at 1154.
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difference being that of timing to the advantage of the consumer.
One could take account of the business activities of a taxpayer by
looking through the business entity and viewing entity transactions as
having been conducted by its owners. Alternatively, counterpart tax
could be imposed on the business entity. Thus, in the event business
taxpayers are taxed separately and their consumed income is not
viewed as income of their owners, the entity would measure
consumption as net income less savings and investment. As such, the
consumed income tax applied at the business entity level would
permit that entity to deduct from gross income any amounts spent on
investment in plant and equipment or inventory during the year (in
16
addition to ordinary operating expenses). In contrast, the income
tax applied at the business level would require capitalization of such
expenditures if they created an asset or benefit extending beyond the
17
year of the expenditure.
This form of consumption tax was incorporated into a legislative
proposal known as the USA Tax (which also incorporated a
18
subtraction VAT at the business level). The USA Tax was a hybrid
consumption tax, imposed in part directly on individuals as a
consumed income tax and in part indirectly by taxing businesses, to be
passed on to consumers who purchased products or services from
those businesses. The USA Tax did not attempt to tax consumption
out of previous savings, on which tax had previously been paid. This
19
attempt at fairness towards retirees gave rise to perhaps the most
significant problem with the proposal, which was the difficulty of
accounting for existing liquid assets owned by taxpayers at the time of
enactment, thereby leaving room for wealthy taxpayers to avoid
future taxation. Moreover, there was a perceived need to prevent
wealthy taxpayers from financing their consumption tax-free through
borrowing, which would be possible if the tax base were limited to a
15

Id.
See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the
Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836 (1999) (explaining that under a
tax such as the USA Tax, businesses would pay tax on their total sales, reduced by
inputs from other firms and for purchases of business products, such as plants and
equipment). See the detailed discussion of the subtraction VAT in the text infra note
31.
17
I.R.C. § 263; Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1987).
18
The USA Tax actually couples the consumed income tax at the individual
level with a subtraction VAT at the business level. See Murray Weidenbaum, The
Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM
54 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
19
Id. at 55.
16
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20

One may consider the
taxpayer’s income (reduced by savings).
inclusion of borrowing in the tax base of a consumed income tax as a
way of accounting for negative savings. The inclusion of borrowing in
the tax base (and allowance of deductions for repayments), however,
was deemed too difficult for the general public to either understand or
21
accept.
A shift to a consumed income tax would place the burden of the
entire tax on that portion of income that is not saved or invested,
namely consumption. The composition of the tax base, and therefore
the definition of income, in this context will be very important with
regard to existing wealth. In its purest form, any cash withdrawn from
savings or investments and spent on consumption would be included
22
in the tax base in the same way as if it constituted income. This form
would subject all existing wealth to the new tax when spent on
consumption, even if the earnings that gave rise to the wealth had
23
already been subjected to the income tax. See Appendix, Example
20

Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax
Reform, 73 TAX NOTES 967, 971 (Nov. 25, 1996) (“The USA [T]ax raises
administrative problems[,] . . . . [many of which] revolve around the need to keep
track of assets in existence at the time the new tax would take effect and to distinguish
them from assets created later.”); see also Steven A. Bank, The Progressive
Consumption Tax Revisited, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2238, 2252 (2003) (“[The USA Tax]
failed to include borrowing in income. A taxpayer could pay for consumption with
borrowed funds and deduct salary as savings, leaving the taxpayer owing no tax.”)
(citations omitted); Alvin C. Warren Jr., The Proposal for an “Unlimited Savings
Allowance”, 68 TAX NOTES 1103, 1108 (Aug. 28, 1995) (stating that the USA Tax
“assumes that basis represents previously taxed amounts, but th[is] assumption is not
valid for assets purchased with borrowed funds”). This is problematic, because it
allows a deferral of taxation beyond the date of consumption and creates a timing
mismatch that could be important if the graduated rates change between borrowing
and repayment. Id. An additional problem with the USA Tax was that it failed to
repeal the estate and gift taxes, and critics claimed that this was inconsistent, because
“anyone who believes that each person should be taxed according to what he actually
withdraws from the economic pie should . . . support the termination of estate and gift
taxes because these transfers of wealth do not entail any actual consumption.”
LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX 58 (1997).
21
Bank, supra note 20, at 2252 (stating that “the USA [T]ax was never seriously
considered,” both because of its inconsistencies, such as its failure to include
borrowing as income and because it was deemed “overly complicated”).
22
See Andrews, supra note 7, at 1148–62.
23
John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income
Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax
Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2127 (2000) (“[I]f the United States enacted a pure
transactional consumption or expenditure tax . . . it would impose huge losses on
holders of existing wealth, because consumption funded by the previously taxed
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1, for a numerical example of this consequence.
Presumably, the shortfall in collections resulting from eliminating
a tax on saved income would be made up for by an increase in the tax
24
rate on the smaller tax base. The initial impact of an increase in tax
rate would be to increase a taxpayer’s cost of consumption by the
increase in the tax rate, thereby leaving the taxpayer with a reduced
25
amount of after-tax wealth to be spent on consumption. Thus the
value to the taxpayer of his gross amount of consumed income could
be further reduced by the increase in the tax rate, with a similar
impact on existing wealth. Further, one would expect demand for
consumption goods to decline as a result of the effective price increase
resulting from the tax incurred by spending on consumption and that
some of the tax would be borne by producers and their factors of
26
production.
The first level effect of the tax would be to reduce the purchasing

wealth would be taxed again under the new form of tax.”).
24
Eliminating the tax on capital income means that higher rates must be applied
to the smaller remaining tax base (i.e., labor income). See Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat
Tax and Other Proposals: Who Will Bear the Tax Burden?, 69 TAX NOTES 1517, 1520
(Dec. 18, 1995) (noting that exemption of old capital from tax will result in higher
taxes for the smaller base). While the exemption of such consumption may seem
fairer, transition relief for old capital also fundamentally changes the nature of a
consumption tax, making it essentially a wage tax. Aaron & Gale, supra note 20, at
969.
25
McNulty, supra note 23 (“Prices probably would rise[,] . . . . [but] [e]ven if
prices did not rise, the purchasing power of existing wealth would probably drop by a
percentage equal to the new consumption tax rate, applied on top of old prices.”).
However, for those without substantial pre-transition savings who intend to save later
(i.e., the young), the exemption from any tax on earnings from savings would be
“large enough to offset the slightly higher tax rate imposed.” Gravelle, supra note 24,
at 1520–21.
26
McNulty, supra note 25, at 2127 (pointing out that the institution of a wage tax
at a higher rate could cause price changes resulting from changed demand of assets).
However, it is worth noting that whether or not price increases will decrease demand
depends on the relative elasticity of demand for a given good. Demand for inelastic
goods does not generally decline and therefore there would not be downward
pressure on prices for staples. For these goods, the producers would not share in the
wealth reduction and the effective price increase would be borne by consumers alone.
For a further discussion of elasticities of supply and demand, see Goldberg, E-Tax,
supra note 1, at 14–15. Moreover, the timing of adjustments may be relevant.
According to classical Keynsian economic theory, prices do not adjust in the short
run, but the neo-Keynsian and neo-classical economic theories posit long-run price
adjustment. Hence, the issue is not only which prices are capable of adjustment, but
also when they may adjust. See Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with
Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. REV. 171, 174–76 (2003).
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power of a taxpayer’s existing assets — that is, wealth — by a
percentage equal to the amount of the tax rate less the portion of the
27
tax, if any, borne by the producers. Moreover, even if the consumed
income tax represents a shift from the existing income tax, the net
effect on existing wealth will also be as described above. For example,
a taxpayer with no income from services but who sells investment
assets in order to consume would be taxed on the full amount of those
sales proceeds, which under the income tax would have been subject
to tax only to the extent those proceeds exceeded the taxpayer’s basis
in those assets.
Thus the adoption of the cash flow consumed income
consumption tax in the absence of transition relief would erode
existing wealth in the form of cash by subjecting it to tax and thereby
diminish its purchasing power by the amount of the tax. There would
be a similar effect in the case of non-cash assets to the extent that the
asset has a basis close to the fair market value of the asset. These
effects would be offset by the prospect of an increase in the value of
existing capital resulting from the freedom of the return on that
capital from future taxation, because return on capital would be
28
excluded from the tax base unless consumed. Indeed, some owners
of wealth may even derive a net benefit from these effects if they can
29
accumulate wealth and defer consumption sufficiently.
Further,
different assets would be affected differently. These effects will be
discussed in Part III.
B. VAT Systems and Retail Sales Tax
A second way to tax consumption is to impose a tax on the sellers
of goods and services (other than employees) and thereby tax
consumption indirectly. One model of this indirect consumption tax is
the subtraction method VAT. A subtraction method VAT is
computed on an annual basis by the seller and could be collected
30
annually at each stage of production. The tax due is computed by
multiplying the VAT rate by the excess of the taxpayer’s gross

27

See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text
See Shounak Sarkar & George R. Zodrow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a
Direct Consumption Tax, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 359 (1993); see also William M. Gentry &
R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based
Consumption Tax, 11 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 1 (1997).
29
See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28; see also Gentry & Hubbard, supra note
28.
30
Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 37.
28
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31

receipts over its deductible expenditures for the year. The cost of
raw materials and capital would be deductible in computing value
32
added. In contrast, the cost of labor and returns on capital would
33
not.
An alternative way to enact a VAT or its equivalent is to adopt a
European style credit invoice VAT or a retail sales tax. Indeed, when
most lay people think about a consumption tax, they think about a tax
levied indirectly on consumption at the point of sale. These tax
structures employ “point of sale taxation,” or “transaction taxation,”
instead of annual taxation as under a subtraction VAT. A credit
invoice tax is best understood in terms of a retail sales tax. A retail
sales tax imposes a tax on the retail purchase of commodities, which
34
could include labor. Sales at stages earlier than the retail level are
not subject to the tax. As discussed in a prior article, imposing the tax
on the gross amount of retail sales ensures that all of the component
costs of production (i.e., raw materials, labor, etc.) as well as returns
on capital (i.e., interest, rent, and profits) are included in the tax base,
35
because they will be reflected in the price of the product.
36
A general sales tax imposes the tax at a uniform rate. In contrast
to a general sales tax, a selective sales tax or excise tax is levied at

31

Id.; see also Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21st Century: The Role
for a Consumption Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 139 (1999).
32
See generally 3 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984). The cost of capital is only fully
deductible in a consumption style VAT, not a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or
Income Type VAT. Id. at 5–7.
33
See id.; see also Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in
Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 91, 97 (Michael J. Boskin
ed., 1996) (pointing out that value added includes the value of labor and return to
capital, and therefore they would be included in the tax base). Facially, a subtraction
method VAT resembles the corporate income tax, except that investments are
expensed and no deduction is allowed for labor and interest costs. JOEL SLEMROD &
JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER
TAX REFORM 198 (1996); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 32, at 7–8.
It thereby would enjoy a great deal of legitimacy and public acceptance in broad
concept. If wages and interest income were taxed to the respective recipients but
allowed as a deduction at the business tax level, then the remaining distinction
between a subtraction method VAT at the business level and a business income tax
would be the treatment of capital expenditures — deductible under a VAT but
capitalized and depreciated, if appropriate, under a business income tax.
34
See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 441 (5th ed. 1999).
35
Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 34.
36
Id. at 33–34 (referencing ROSEN, supra note 34, at 441).
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For
different rates (including zero) on different commodities.
simplicity, the analysis that follows will assume a general sales tax that
38
is an ad valorem tax like the national sales tax that is under
39
consideration to replace the income tax.
40
A credit invoice VAT, in substance, works like a sales tax. It
41
differs from a retail sales tax in that it is collected in stages. It is this
difference that results in its compliance advantages: it has built-in
42
protection from evasion. Each producer pays a tax on the value
43
added to the product being sold. The tax is implemented by means
of a tax imposed at the full rate on the full value of the product when
44
sold at retail. Thus the price of the product to the consumer includes
the tax computed by applying the VAT rate to the tax-exclusive price
45
of the product or service.
Under a credit-invoice method VAT, the retail seller is permitted
a credit against the tax that must be remitted upon retail sale of the
46
product. The credit equals the VAT that the seller paid for raw
materials, inventory, and equipment (but not wages), which was
47
included in the price paid by the seller. In this manner, the retail
seller is required only to remit a net tax payment equivalent to the
48
VAT rate times the value that the retail seller added to the product.

37

Id. at 34 (referencing ROSEN, supra note 34, at 442 and referring to a selective
sales tax as “an excise tax, or a differential commodity tax”).
38
See ROSEN, supra note 34, at 442 (explaining that an ad valorem tax is
calculated based on the percentage of the purchase price); Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, in
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 160, 176 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (describing a tax
based on a percentage of purchase price).
39
The national retail sales tax that has been proposed as a replacement for the
current income tax, like state sales taxes, is an ad valorem tax. Ad valorem taxes are
taxes imposed as a percentage of the price. Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 34.
40
See DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION
34 (1996).
41
Schenk, supra note 31, at 139.
42
Cf. Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place
in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 285–87 (1987) (arguing that the VAT
might reduce evasion, but this benefit would not outweigh the “attendant tax
administration and taxpayer compliance costs”).
43
Schenk, supra note 31, at 139–40.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Metcalf, supra note 33, at 93–94; see also Schenk, supra note 42, at 286.
47
See Metcalf, supra note 33, at 93–94.
48
Schenk, supra note 31, at 139.
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Thus, a credit invoice method VAT collects a tax at each stage of
production through ultimate retail sale, but the aggregate amount of
tax collected is no greater than the amount that would be collected as
49
The credit VAT carries the
a retail sales tax at the final sale.
advantage of being able to be tracked and collected electronically.
If a VAT or retail sales tax were instituted in an otherwise taxfree world, prices faced by consumers would experience a one-time
increase by the amount of the tax to reflect inclusion of the tax
(although some of the tax may be borne by producers and their
factors of production in the same manner as in a cash flow consumed
50
income tax discussed earlier).
See Appendix, Example 1. The
extent to which the price increase would not be as large as the new tax
amount, would depend upon how the cost of the tax was shared by
51
producers and consumers. It is difficult to know a priori exactly how
the VAT would be shared between consumers and producers and the
extent to which the portion borne by producers would be passed on to
wage earners and other factors of production.
On the other hand, if the VAT or sales tax completely replaced
the current individual income tax, a taxpayer with earnings would
have more of those earnings available to spend, having been freed
from the burden of the direct tax on those earnings (assuming wages
were not decreased to reflect their freedom from tax, perhaps an
unrealistic assumption). The taxpayer’s existing wealth as well as
earnings, however, would be burdened with the new tax when spent,
even if the existing wealth had previously been subjected to income

49

Id.
Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S.
Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 301 (2002) (“When it first takes effect, the
consumption tax might produce consumer price increases equal to the amount of the
tax . . . .”); see also Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected International
Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1047
(1997) (“The economic effect [of a destination-based consumption tax] would be a
one-time price increase by the tax rate . . . .”). Some of the price increases would be
offset by reduced demand and some would be expected to be passed back to factors
of production. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the tax
were instituted in lieu of the current income tax, the price increase would be offset by
the increase in their weekly paychecks due to the elimination of the income tax and
therefore would have little adverse impact for the majority of taxpayers. Graetz,
supra note 50.
51
See Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that the more elastic the
demand curve for a product, the smaller the tax burden borne by the consumer, while
the more elastic the supply curve for a product, the smaller the portion of the tax that
will be borne by producers).
50
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tax. Existing wealth, therefore, would lose purchasing power because
the price of consumption goods would effectively include the new
52
tax. See Appendix, Example 2. This devaluation of the purchasing
power of assets would be most easily seen with respect to cash, which
would suffer from the one-time devaluation or “inflationary shot” of
the inclusion of the VAT in prices of goods. Wealth in the form of
property, however, would also suffer the devaluation (to the extent of
its basis). On the other hand, there may be offsetting effects,
including the relief that the wealth would enjoy from the burden of
future tax on any income or gain that is not spent on immediate
consumption by virtue of the elimination of the income tax. Further,
different kinds of property will be differentially affected. In short,
these effects should be the same as under the consumed income tax,
absent transition relief. The potential effect on various kinds of
property, including business assets and equity interests, will be
discussed later.
C. Two-Tier Consumption Tax
A variation of the subtraction method VAT discussed above is
the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax, which is a subtraction method VAT that
53
allows a deduction for wages as if they were purchases of materials.
Wage earners would be taxed on those wages at rates that could be set
as graduated or flat, with or without a zero bracket amount, and with
54
or without personal exemptions and deductions. Hall and Rabushka
proposed a flat rate equal to the VAT rate, with a limited zero bracket
55
amount and limited individual deductions.
David Bradford also proposed a two-tier consumption tax, which
56
he called the “X Tax.” The X Tax consists of a modified subtraction
VAT on the business side, in which wages are allowed as deductions
and the remaining base is taxed at a single rate, coupled with a
graduated rate wage tax on the individual side in which the top tax
57
rate is set at the VAT rate. Most recently, Bradford suggested that

52

See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28, at 362; see also Gentry & Hubbard,
supra note 28, at 10–11.
53
ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 62 (2d ed. 1995).
54
See id. at 58–59.
55
See id.
56
David F. Bradford, Principal Paper: Blueprint for International Tax Reform,
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1449 (2001).
57
David Bradford has written extensively on this proposal, most recently in
David F. Bradford, A Tax System for the Twenty-first Century, in TOWARD
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the compensation tax component depart from a wage tax and instead
58
take the form of a cash flow consumed income tax.
A third two-tier consumption tax proposal is this author’s “E
59
Tax.” The E Tax combines a credit invoice VAT at the business
level with a wage tax at the individual level. Its essential claimed
advantage over the Flat Tax is that the use of the credit VAT
60
facilitates automatic and electronic collection of the tax.
A two-tier consumption tax would entail the same consequences
for existing wealth as a consumed income tax or a VAT, but the
mechanics would be partly those involved with each form, as discussed
previously. See Appendix, Example 1.
D. Yield Exemption Tax: Exclusion from Tax of Investment Earnings
The fourth way to tax consumption is to tax all income from labor
and business, regardless of whether it is saved or spent, but exclude
income earned on investment assets. This method of consumption tax
is referred to as “yield exemption.”
Under certain assumptions and circumstances, yield exemption is
the theoretical economic equivalent of the consumed income version
of a consumption tax. These assumptions and circumstances are (1)
61
uniform tax rates over time, (2) the deduction produces an
immediate tax saving determined by that uniform rate, and (3) the tax
savings from the deduction will yield the same return as the rest of the
62
investment.
Under these assumptions and circumstances, yield
exemption will replicate the effect of allowing the deduction for
63
savings as under the consumed income tax model. To the extent,
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 11 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005).
This was his last writing before his untimely recent death.
58
Id. at 29. Under Bradford’s most recent modification, the X Tax could
capture the receipt of a worker’s qualified retirement savings in the individual’s tax
base without having to view it as a type of deferred wages, which would be the case if
the compensation tax component took the form of a wage tax under which investment
returns were excluded from the tax base. Id.
59
Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1.
60
Id. at 48–51.
61
This assures that the tax saved by virtue of the deduction will be collected at
the same rate upon sale of the asset.
62
This equates a yield exemption investment with an immediately deductible
investment of the same amount. If the equivalence is instead based on the amount of
after-tax investment, then the assumption is not necessary. See infra notes 63–64.
63
To illustrate this point, consider a taxpayer’s investment of $100 in year 1 for
which a deduction would be allowed under the cash flow consumption tax model.
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Suppose that the taxpayer’s tax rate is 30% and the item will generate the cumulative
amount of $200 in year 3, which will be withdrawn for consumption and therefore
taxable. As a result, a post-tax investment of $70 (the result of a pre-tax investment
of $100 for which a deduction is allowed) will result in pre-tax income of $200, which
when withdrawn and taxed will amount to post-tax income of $140 ($200 – $60 (tax)).
Under these facts, the taxpayer’s net after-tax profit is $70 ($140 (post-tax return) –
$70 (post-tax investment)) and rate of profit for the relevant years is 100%.
Similarly, if no deduction were allowed for the investment, but the resulting
income was exempted from tax, as under the yield exemption model, then under these
same assumptions, the taxpayer’s rate of profit will be the same as the foregoing
illustration. Specifically, the $100 nondeductible expenditure represents a post-tax
investment of $100. In year 3, it generates the cumulative amount of $200, which is
exempt from tax. Under these facts, the taxpayer’s net after-tax profit is $100 and
rate of profit for the relevant years is 100%.
In these two examples, the taxpayer’s rate of profit is the same, namely 100%.
Further, the taxpayer in the first example could duplicate the second taxpayer’s
amount of profit by investing the after-tax contribution amount of $100 instead of
only $70. For example, suppose the taxpayer invested $142.86 before tax and
therefore $100 ($142.86 – $42.86 (tax)) after tax to generate $285.72 before tax,
representing a $200 after-tax amount ($285.72 – $85.72 (tax)), and $100 after-tax
profit from the $100 after-tax amount invested. The taxpayer’s rate of profit remains
at 100% and his after-tax profit amount is $100 ($200 – $100).
This equivalence can be demonstrated mathematically as follows: Let C equal
the after-tax contribution amount (so that C/(1 – t) represents the before tax
equivalent amount), r equal the rate of return and t equal the tax rate (assumed to be
constant). The yield exemption savings at the end of the period will be represented
by C(l + r). Under the consumed income model, the after-tax savings would be
computed as follows: After-tax savings = (C/(1 – t))(l + r)(l – t), which is the beforetax contribution C/(l – t), multiplied by one plus the rate of return (l + r), multiplied
by the percentage remaining after a tax of t is imposed on the entire account upon
distribution (l – t). This simplifies to C(l + r) and demonstrates the equivalence.
The above comparison is illustrated in the following table:
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however, that returns to capital exceed the uniform assumed “risk
free” rate of return under the above assumptions and the taxpayer
under the consumed income method can not increase her after-tax
investment by the amount of tax savings resulting from expensing the
investment in order to take advantage of that return, yield exemption
provides a greater benefit to capital than immediate expensing as
64
under the consumed income method.
The basic equivalence described above, however, facilitates
comparison of the methods. The differences between the effects of

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF CASH FLOW CONSUMED INCOME TREATMENT WITH YIELD
EXEMPTION TREATMENT

Cash
Flow
Treatment

Taxes Due

Amount in

Contri-

During

Account,Including

bution

Investment

Earnings, at End of

Period

Period

142.86*

0

100

0

Taxes Due

Amount

at End of

Remaining

AfterTax

Period

After Tax

Profit

285.72

85.72**

200

100

200

0

200

100

Yield
Exemption
Treatment

* Represents $100 after effect of deduction: $142.86 (1 – 0.30) = $100
** $285.72 * 30% = $85.72
The above equivalence demonstrates the Treasury Department’s statement that
“permitting the capital cost of an asset to be expensed has the effect of exempting the
income from ownership of the asset from taxation.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
STUDY ON TAX DEPRECIATION POLICY OPTIONS, 116 CONG. REC. 25685 (daily ed.
July 23, 1970). This theoretical equivalence is sometimes referred to as the Cary
Brown theorem. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91, 99 (Apr. 5, 2004).
The first illustration, under the cash flow consumed income model, is the method
followed under the traditional IRA. The second illustration, under the yield
exemption model, is the method followed under the Roth IRA. The above
comparison shows them to be identical in effect.
64
See Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 28, at 7–9. This potential effect is
eliminated in the example supra note 63, when the taxpayer is able to “scale up” her
investment without suffering a reduction in the rate of return on the investment. That
is, she is able to invest the same “after-tax” amount, $100, in both instances, thereby
assuring that she would receive the equivalent rate of return on the tax savings that
she receives on the investment itself (condition (3) in the text). See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. The inability to scale up when making investments generating
supernormal returns, however, creates the caveat to the theoretical equivalence that is
set forth in the text.
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the methods are important in dealing with the transition from the
current income tax to a form of consumption tax.
As noted above, the yield exemption consumption tax alternative
appears to be a variation of the income tax model. The variance from
the income tax is that it permits the returns from investments to be
exempt from tax.
It has been argued that a yield exemption tax should be viewed as
a wage tax, and therefore something different than a consumption
65
tax. Although the yield exemption tax has a close resemblance to a
wage tax, this view ignores the business income component of the
yield exemption tax, which necessarily taxes the return on capital
devoted to business uses supplied as equity (to the extent that interest
on business debt remains deductible, it is not included in the business
66
income tax base) as well as windfall gains.
Thus, whereas it
resembles a wage tax, it necessarily diverges from it (indeed has a
broader base) largely because of the practical inability to separate
(and exempt) the return from capital invested in the business from the
return from personal services devoted to the business. Conversely, it
also diverges from a wage tax (has a narrower base), because it
effectively exempts from the tax base the return from personal
services devoted to selecting and monitoring investments.
The yield exemption tax leaves existing wealth free from the
erosion that afflicts the other forms of consumption tax. Unlike the
VAT systems, it should not cause price levels to increase and so
should not erode the purchasing power of existing wealth. Also,
unlike the consumed income tax, yield on capital would not be subject
to tax even if spent on consumption. Accordingly, a shift to yield
exemption would actually increase the value of existing capital,
because existing wealth would produce tax-free earnings, whereas
under the income tax those earnings were partly or wholly subject to
65

Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 938 (1975). Professor Warren viewed a
wage tax and a yield exemption tax as equivalent if (1) all wealth is traceable to
original savings out of wages plus simple investment income and the two are capable
of being separated, so that one can be taxed while the other is not and (2) a single tax
rate is applied to all earnings or all consumption expenditures, indefinitely. William
D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88
HARV. L. REV. 947, 953 (1975).
66
Andrews, supra note 65, at 953–54. Professor Andrews pointed out that
neither of Professor Warren’s required conditions could realistically be met in fact,
for numerous reasons including the impossibility of separating wages from investment
income derived from the return on services devoted to finding the investment and
wages from business income derived from capital used in the business. Id. at 954.
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67

tax. This effect would be somewhat moderated from a shift from the
current U.S. income tax, because it already contains many yield
exemption features. But, for example, a reduction in the capital gains
and dividend tax rate from 15% to zero would have a positive effect
on returns to capital and therefore the value of capital, even though
the effect would not be as dramatic as it would be if the current tax
system were a pure income tax.
More significant, however, is that a shift away from the current
tax law’s partial yield exemption approach to one of the other
consumption tax models would magnify the adverse impact of the
change on existing wealth. Further, every additional yield exemption
provision inserted into the tax law makes the transition even more
difficult.
III. MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS: COMPARISON AMONG
CONSUMPTION TAX METHODS
As a baseline, assume first that there is a transition to the first
three systems of consumption tax in a fully and instantaneously
adjusting marketplace for capital, products, and labor. In real terms,
the burden of the consumption taxes would fall on the consumers
(although some of the burden would be shared by producers and
sellers) and would result in a loss of real purchasing power of
consumption goods and services for existing wealth. In the direct tax
situation of the consumed income tax, it would occur in large part,
because consumption purchases bore the tax. In the indirect tax
situation of the VAT systems and RST, it would occur in large part,
because product prices would increase. Simply put, after the change,
existing wealth will have to be spent on goods that will carry an
additional cost equal to the consumption tax on the goods, imposed
either directly through a consumed income tax or indirectly through a
VAT or RST, less any resulting price decrease brought about through
market forces.
On the other hand, freedom from any future tax on capital under
any form of consumption tax could increase the value of capital not
spent on consumption (i.e., invested capital), because it will grow taxfree and therefore faster than under an income tax regime. The CBO
and other economic analysts point out that this effect could offset the
reduction in whole or in part and indeed could exceed the reduction
for some people under all forms of consumption tax, if they can

67

See Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax, supra note 1, at 25.
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accumulate wealth and defer consumption sufficiently.
Even in a perfectly adjustable economy — free from long-term
commitments like bonds, leases, and labor agreements — with no
transition relief, some forms of capital will be disadvantaged relative
to other capital. Under either a direct tax or indirect tax, the value of
69
business assets would decline relative to cash, because the basis of
existing business assets could no longer be used to reduce the tax
imposed on the seller of products. In contrast, cash used to purchase
new business assets would permit full expensing and thereby receive
more favorable treatment than existing capital. Moreover, the
reduced value of business assets will be reflected in the value of equity
(and potentially debt) interests in the businesses owning those assets.
These effects will result under all of the forms of consumption tax
other than yield exemption and the choice among them will be
irrelevant as to their ultimate consequences to existing wealth, absent
70
transition relief.
The imposition of those consumption taxes, however, would
launch a series of likely adjustments to price levels, debt, and other
asset values and interest rates, all dependent on Federal Reserve
reaction. The ultimate effects of these adjustments and Federal
Reserve action will be the same regardless of the form of the
foregoing consumption tax that is chosen, in an economy in which all
prices, interest rates, and wages are fully and instantaneously
adjustable, because the economic incidence of the taxing methods is
71
72
the same. They differ in their legal incidence.
If there were no instantaneous adjustments, however, then the
legal incidence of the tax would affect the transition period during
which adjustments are made by all parties — i.e., consumers,
producers, wage earners, business owners, etc. — and could have an
effect that lasts beyond that period. To understand the magnitude of
the effect of the choice of consumption tax on these factors, assume

68

See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28, at 362; see also Gentry & Hubbard,
supra note 28, at 10–11. The possibility that the adoption of a consumption tax will
increase national savings and, therefore, ultimately productivity and GDP, is beyond
the scope of this Article.
69
See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28, at 363. This conclusion assumes that the
Federal Reserve’s reaction to the new tax is not so over-accommodative that it
substantially reduces the purchasing power of cash.
70
See McNulty, supra note 25, at 2127 (noting the impact on existing wealth in
shifting to a transactional consumption or expenditure tax).
71
See Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 11–13.
72
See id.
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that a consumption tax in the form of a VAT were instituted in an
otherwise no-tax economy. In this hypothetical, a new burden on
capital used for consumption would be imposed on consumed income
equal to the rate of tax multiplied by the amount of consumption.
Thus the effective cost to the consumer of all goods purchased for
consumption (relative to other uses of wealth) might increase by the
amount of the tax imposed on that consumption (or in the case of a
consumed income tax, the portion of income that is not saved). For
example, if there were a 20% VAT imposed, the cost of consuming
73
could increase by as much as 20%.
The effect of the adoption of a VAT on existing wealth would be
less than the VAT rate to the extent that the VAT replaced the
74
existing corporate or business income tax. But the effect on the
value of business assets resulting from the disappearance of basis in
75
those business assets would be the same as it would have been under

73

Of course, as with the imposition of any tax, classical analysis predicts that it is
possible that prices might fall somewhat so that the cost of consumption would not
increase by the full 20%, because the increase in the cost of consumption would
dampen demand for consumption goods. In that event, consumers and producers
would share the effect of the tax. Exactly what that sharing ratio would be (i.e., how
much prices of consumption goods would decrease) would vary among particular
goods, depending upon the elasticities of demand for those goods. But, on balance,
one would expect some downward price adjustments and, therefore, some offset to
the consumer’s effective cost increases. Basic microeconomic theory suggests that an
increase in price for a particular product reduces demand for that product, assuming
some degree of elasticity of demand.
HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 103–07 (4th ed. 1996). Because an
increase in the tax rate for a good effectively increases the price of that good, it
follows that demand would decrease according to the elasticity of demand for that
good, thus exerting downward pressure on the price of the good. Id. See generally
Goldberg, E-Tax, supra note 1, at 14.
74
Economists generally agree that the economic incidence of a business or
corporate tax falls on consumers, because businesses pass the tax to the consumers in
the form of higher prices. Mark D. Urbanski, U.S. Corporate Taxes — The Status
Quo Is Not an Option, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 219, 233 (2005). Therefore, if a
VAT replaced the business tax, consumers would pay prices equal to the amount of
the VAT rate less the rate of the pre-existing business tax.
75
Under a VAT, businesses are allowed to expense the costs of capital goods
and inventory, making it unnecessary to record or track basis. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,
Scoping Out the Uncertain Simplification (Complication?) Effects of VATs, BATs and
Consumed Income Taxes, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 390, 393–94 (1995). While this feature of
the VAT system is attractive on simplicity grounds, the elimination of basis for
business assets would substantially reduce business wealth in the absence of transition
rules. For this reason, many proponents of fundamental tax reform advocate the
imposition of transition rules that would alleviate the harsh effects of the transfer.
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the situation where there had previously been a no-tax economy,
76
because a VAT results in a one-time tax on pre-existing basis.
Where prices are not fully and instantaneously adjustable because
some wealth is held in forms subject to long-term commitments,
however, the adjustments are more complicated. Some forms of
wealth would thereby be protected, but some forms of wealth would
be devalued disproportionately. Adjustments for fixed contractual
obligations and other commitments (such as bonds with fixed interest
rates and long maturities, leases, and labor contracts or arrangements
fixed by custom or expectation) may not be made quickly and indeed
may be obstructed by these obligations and commitments.
The macroeconomic effects on particular investments that are
fixed by long-term commitments could vary with the form of
consumption tax enacted. Further, any monetary policy response to
the tax change would affect these consequences as well. Manipulation
77
of the money supply would affect nominal prices. For example, if
the money supply were held constant at the time of the shift to a 20%
rate VAT, then price increases would be restrained and theoretically,
with the appropriate money supply adjustments, could be eliminated.
That would leave money and dollar-denominated financial assets,
such as bonds, unaffected as to principal. But, under the classical
economic model, one would expect interest rates to increase
substantially as a result of the non-expansionary money supply policy
78
choice, having the effect of devaluing outstanding fixed-interest debt
instruments, particularly those with long-term maturities. These
increases would be tempered by the fact that interest income would
not be taxed, augmenting real return, and interest expense would not
be deductible, increasing the real cost of borrowed money. The net
impact on bond values cannot be predicted a priori. Further, to the
extent that debtors are affected, creditors will be equally affected but
Bradford, supra note 40 (advocating transition rules allowing companies to
immediately deduct their basis at the time of the transition).
76
Bradford, supra note 40, at 20.
77
Monetary policy involves government manipulation of the money supply
through a variety of instruments, including open market operations, changes in
reserve requirements, or discount window lending. ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S.
BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 534, 536 (4th ed. 2001). It is generally accepted that
tightening the money supply slows down the pace of economic activities, thus slowing
inflation and causing prices to fall. Id. at 540–44.
78
Id.; see also Alfred C. Aman Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the
Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 845
(1989) (noting that tightening the money supply via open market transactions or
increasing reserve requirements would result in an increase in interest rates).
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in the opposite direction, although many creditors were tax exempt
under the income tax (e.g., pension funds, charitable organizations),
so that they would obtain no additional advantage from the new
exemption for interest.
The net effect of these adjustments on fixed income assets such as
bonds, certain stocks and property subject to long-term leases, and
other assets that are interest sensitive, would depend upon the nature
and extent of Federal Reserve action. The effect on values of these
kinds of assets would depend on whether the loss from the reduced
consumption purchasing power of the bond (either by virtue of
general price level increases or interest rate increases) would be offset
by the increased value of the bonds resulting from their freedom from
tax on the interest income they generate. If the former exceeded the
latter, then they would suffer devaluation relative to newly issued
financial or other investment assets whose rate of return (whether in
the form of interest rate, dividend yield, or rent rate) would reflect the
79
restrained money supply and resulting higher rate of return.
Moreover, if the debtor is an entity, any change in value of the
debt will be reflected in the value of the ownership interest of the
entity. Thus, if a corporation had issued long-term fixed interest
bonds and contemporaneously with the enactment of a VAT, the
Federal Reserve does not expand the money supply to accommodate
the VAT (thereby eliminating price level increases), any increase or
decrease in the value of the corporation’s bond obligations would be
reflected in the value of the corporation’s stock. Similarly, the value
of equities could decline, because the value of their existing
depreciable or saleable assets would be reduced as explained earlier.
On the other hand, corporate dividends and capital gains would no
longer be taxable to shareholders, so the value of equities, freed from
the existing double tax burden applicable to C corporations, could
80
actually increase.
Thus, a VAT would be expected to reduce the value of assets in
general and therefore reduce existing wealth of some asset owners,
with the effects on particular assets dependent on what other
adjustments are made by the government and the market reaction to
those adjustments and other conditions. The existence of pre-existing
79

It is generally accepted that increases in market rates cause the fair value of
fixed-rate assets to fall, because the income streams they produce fall below what the
market demands. THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, INSIGHTS FOR BANK
DIRECTORS: ASSET AND LIABILITY COMMITTEE, http://www.stlouisfed.org/col/
director/alco/joinmeeting_sourcesofmarketrisk.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
80
See Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 28, at 39–42.
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legal obligations and commitments will affect parties differently
during the transition period, because such obligations are generally
not adjusted for changes in currency valuation, market interest rates,
81
and prices. Predicting the effect of a shift in the tax system on any
particular assets, however, is fraught with uncertainty, because the
Federal Reserve’s monetary response would not be predictable.
The macro-economic effects of VAT systems do differ in one
important respect from those of direct consumption taxes like the
consumed income tax or the two-tier consumption taxes (as they
apply to wage income). That difference involves price changes and
results from the phenomenon of “wage stickiness.” Under a VAT,
prices of consumption goods would rise to reflect inclusion of the
VAT and presumably an accommodative monetary expansion on the
82
part of the Federal Reserve.
If the Federal Reserve is not
accommodative, then prices would not increase and the adjustment
required would apply pressure to reduce wage rates to reflect their
freedom from tax. Wage rates may be prevented from being adjusted
downward, however, due to the general principle of “wage
83
stickiness.” Wage stickiness may result from union or employment
contracts, or simply wage-earner unwillingness to accept a reduced
nominal wage rate for psychological reasons, even though the
workers’ real wage (adjusted for the purchasing power of money)
84
would not be reduced. As a result, it is expected that the Federal
Reserve would choose to be accommodative to avoid increased
unemployment and the economy would experience resulting price
85
increases.
In contrast, no such issue would afflict the two-tier or the
86
consumed income forms of consumption tax in any significant way.
That is because under both of those consumption taxes wages would
87
continue to bear the tax. Further, under the two-tier form wage
expenditures would continue to be deductible (or give rise to VAT
credits as under the E-Tax), while under a pure consumed income tax
there would be no separate business component.
81

Effects will also vary among similarly situated taxpayers, because, as Gentry
and Hubbard have observed, “households are likely to differ in their portfolio
choices.” Id. at 14.
82
CBO STUDY, supra note 2, at 65.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 65–66.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
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Under a hybrid consumed income tax/VAT such as the USA Tax
proposal, however, one would experience a likely one-time price
increase because of the VAT business component from which wages
would not be deductible. Thus, price increases would be more likely
to occur under a VAT and a hybrid consumed income/VAT proposed
tax than under the two-tier or pure consumed income consumption
tax proposals.
Thus, the choice of the method of imposing a consumption tax is
not irrelevant to the participants in the economy and, as suggested
above, some of the adjustment can be affected and obstacles to
adjustment overcome through manipulation of the money supply.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty about particular assets in an economy
with pre-existing commitments does not belie the general conclusion
that aggregate wealth existing at the time of the changeover will suffer
a reduction in consumption purchasing power.
In contrast to the other consumption tax proposals, a movement
from a pure income tax to a yield exemption consumption tax would
not create difficult transition issues for capital (other than capital
currently enjoying a tax-free yield under the income tax). That is
because existing wealth would not suffer reduced purchasing power by
reason of the change. Rather, the value of existing wealth, on which
tax has already been paid, would likely be enhanced, because it would
enjoy the advantage of future tax-free yield. For example, long-term
fixed income investments like bonds should increase in value under a
yield exemption model, because the interest to which they are entitled
would be tax-free. Also, stocks on which dividends and capital gains
from sale would be tax-free would also be expected to increase in
value. But, these effects could be tempered by an increased amount
of investment attracted by the lure of tax-free yields and the effect of
the shift in taxing regimes on the underlying companies that have
issued the stocks or bonds. Presumably, their labor costs would
increase by virtue of the higher taxes that would have to be borne by
workers, who would demand higher wages. Also, one would expect
higher taxes to be borne by the business firms themselves to make up
for the revenue shortfall resulting from the change.
In addition, some particular forms of assets would be
disadvantaged by the change. They would be assets that already enjoy
income tax exemptions, such as municipal bonds. This exemption
explains the current spread between the taxable yield on corporate
bonds and the lower tax-free yield on municipal bonds. With all
investment assets enjoying the attribute of tax-free yield, one would
expect the market value of municipal bonds to decline. Owner
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occupied housing may also fall into this category. The obstacle
88
presented by this phenomenon is discussed in Part V.
Finally, to the extent that the current federal income tax is in part
a yield exemption system, conversion to a pure yield exemption
system would not have the magnitude of consequences as would a
conversion from a pure income tax. Nevertheless, one would expect
some of the wealth enhancement consequences described above to
result.
IV. TRANSITION TO ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CONSUMPTION
TAX AND TRANSITION RELIEF FOR EXISTING WEALTH
The most important difference between a consumption tax and an
income tax is that a consumption tax does not tax the return from
89
savings and investment, whereas an income tax does. As explained
above, consumption taxes accomplish this by (1) allowing a deduction
for saving and investment, as in the case of a consumed income tax,
(2) taxing only amounts spent on consumption, as in the case of a
VAT, or (3) directly exempting investment income from tax, as in the
case of the yield exemption tax. This difference is independent of the
method chosen to tax consumption. Moreover, as demonstrated
90
above, all forms of consumption tax would tax wages and all forms of
consumption tax other than the yield exemption form would tax
91
existing wealth in addition to wages.
Transition rules that exempt old wealth from tax would convert
92
any proposed consumption tax into a wage tax. This is the case
regardless of whether the tax under consideration is a consumed
income tax, a VAT, or a two-tier consumption tax.
The method of consumption tax, in addition, can affect the ease
with which transition rules can be crafted to lessen the impact of the
shift on existing wealth. Indeed, transition relief that has the

88

See infra Part V.
Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Introduction, in TOWARD
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1, 5 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005).
90
Gravelle, supra note 24, at 1521; see also Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 28, at
11–12.
91
See Gravelle, supra note 24, at 1521.
92
Id.; see also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 33, at 175 (“[T]he more transition
relief that is provided to existing assets in the switch to any consumption tax, the
more it becomes like a wage tax.”). But see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text
(drawing a distinction between a yield exemption tax and a wage tax). Also note that
a yield exemption tax needs no transition rules to exempt old wealth.
89
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appearance of being justified and that can be given without undue
administrative difficulty differs markedly among the forms of
consumption tax.
A. Transition Relief for Existing Wealth Under a Consumed Income
Tax
Under a consumed income tax, the tax on consumption is
accomplished by imposing a tax on income (as broadly defined) that is
93
consumed and not saved.
The effect of the shift to a consumed
income tax from an income tax would be most pronounced with
94
regard to dispositions of capital.
For example, absent transition
relief, the entire proceeds of a sale of property by a taxpayer —
whether investment property, business property, or inventory —
would be subject to tax without offset by the basis that the taxpayer
had in the property. Such a result effectively reduces the purchasing
power of that old capital, because it is again subjected to tax even
though it was originally purchased with after-tax money. Of course, to
the extent the original cost had been deducted through depreciation
or the value of the property represented untaxed appreciation, the
effect described above would not be present. The undepreciated cost
of a taxpayer’s property, however, would be erased forever, absent
transition relief.
The same effect would be obtained for withdrawals from savings
accounts that are spent on consumption. Even though one might view
these accounts as cash, they present the same problem as the basis in
investment assets and therefore the resolution of the problem should
be the same. Subjecting these accounts to tax upon withdrawal
effectively reduces their purchasing power to an amount below the
face amount or nominal account balance. This latter effect would
present significant compliance issues with regard to hidden cash at
time of enactment, which may make transition to this system without
95
liberal transition relief a practical impossibility.

93

David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39
TAX NOTES 383, 384 (Apr. 18, 1988).
94
McNulty, supra note 25, at 2128 (noting that without transition relief, the shift
to a consumption tax would disadvantage existing holders of wealth).
95
See Joseph Bankman, The Engler-Knoll Consumption Tax Proposal: What
Transition Rule Does Fairness (or Politics) Require?, 56 SMU L. REV 83, 96 (2003)
(“[U]nder a cash flow tax, the basis of all savings is zero, and the entire amount of
dissaving is subject to tax. A cash flow tax thus increases the incentive to hide asset
sales and creates an incentive to hide savings withdrawals.”).
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Transition relief is easily prescribed under a consumed income tax
with regard to unrecovered basis and existing cash and bank accounts.
It could involve reducing the taxable proceeds of sale by the basis of
the property or, with regard to depreciable property, allowing
continued depreciation of the basis. Similarly, taxpayers could be
permitted tax-free withdrawals from cash balance savings accounts
existing at the time of enactment. Those transition rules, however,
would reduce the post-enactment tax collections substantially and
would force higher tax rates to be imposed on the smaller base to
meet revenue needs. As such, they would magnify the impact of the
new tax on the cost of consumption and thereby devalue the
remainder of a taxpayer’s existing wealth, consisting of the previously
untaxed appreciation of assets. However, as described above, this
upward adjustment in tax rates would impact producers and factors of
production as well. Higher tax rates would also increase the tax
burden on wages.
The consumed income model has the appearance of being more
worthy of transition relief than either the VAT or two-tier
consumption tax. This is because the consumed income model bears a
closer resemblance to the income tax on individuals than either form
of VAT system or two-tier tax. The resemblance occurs largely
because it is imposed on the individual directly, like the income tax.
As a result, relief from the adverse impact of the shift on previously
taxed existing wealth seems more justifiable as an avoidance of unfair
double taxation.
Further, transition relief can be more easily accomplished
administratively, because the mechanisms exist in a recognizable and
acceptable form to accomplish it. For example, as explained earlier,
sales of property and withdrawals of cash from existing accounts will
only be impacted when spent on personal consumption, absent
transition relief. But, at that time the property and accounts will
suffer the devaluation discussed earlier, because only the after-tax
amount will be available to be spent for consumption goods and
services. Transition relief can be accomplished by continuing to use
the basis concept of the income tax. Thus, a taxpayer who dissaves by
selling assets and consumes the proceeds could be subjected to tax
only on the proceeds, reduced by the basis in the asset. Under an
income tax mindset, this type of transition relief appears justified,
because basis represents expenditure with amounts on which tax has
already been paid and therefore should not again be subject to tax.
Similarly, savings accounts should also be viewed as having basis that
includes all previously taxed principal and interest under this type of
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transition relief. In contrast, unrealized appreciation has never been
taxed and therefore would not be entitled to transition relief. In this
manner, only amounts that have already been subjected to the income
tax would be protected from being subjected to the consumption tax
that replaced the income tax.
The transition relief described above would convert the tax
largely into a wage tax, but also a tax on unrealized appreciation and
other items like deferred compensation that had not been taxed under
the income tax. In the case of items that do not present the case of
double taxed amounts, such as unrealized appreciation or the receipt
of tax deferred income from qualified or other plans, it is unlikely that
a serious argument could be made that transition relief should be
available. Clearly, if no income tax has ever been collected, then
transition rules are unwarranted.
B. Transition Relief for Existing Wealth Under a VAT or RST
As discussed above, the same effect on existing wealth would
occur under an indirect tax in the form of a subtraction method VAT,
credit invoice VAT, or RST as under a consumed income tax. In
these cases, the seller would internalize the added tax in setting its
prices. The resulting higher prices would devalue the amount of
consumption that could be purchased with existing wealth. Further,
existing business assets with basis would be devalued as well relative
to newly purchased equivalent business property; this devaluation
would be reflected in the value of equity interests in the affected
businesses relative to equivalent newly created businesses.
As is the case with a cash flow consumed income tax, transition
rules could reduce the impact of a shift on existing wealth. It is much
more difficult, however, to create transition rules that are directly
applicable to the consumer in a subtraction VAT than in a consumed
income tax. Rather, transition rules under a VAT are typically
suggested to apply at the producer level with regard to the costs of
96
existing assets used in or purchased for production.
Transition relief could ameliorate the adverse effect of these
forms of consumption tax on existing wealth. In the case of a
subtraction VAT, however, the phenomenon of double taxation at the
96

See generally Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV.
283 (1990). In theory, one could provide transition protection for existing wealth by
having the government subsidize spending from existing wealth. The specter of the
government writing checks to private individuals in proportion to their existing wealth
that is spent on consumption, however, is difficult to imagine.
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individual level does not have the appearance of being unfair.
Individuals who have existing wealth in the form of cash or
unrecovered basis in property will not again bear the legal incidence
of tax on sale. Accordingly, basis in property is treated just like
unrealized appreciation in the property, but neither gives rise to gain
as such. That is because the legal incidence of a VAT is on the seller.
Thus only the very sophisticated would clamor for transition rules
with regard to unrecovered basis in investment assets or savings, even
though there would indeed be double taxation of these amounts.
At the business level, however, where the legal incidence of the
tax is placed, businesses would perceive as unfair a tax on sales, offset
by new purchases but not by undepreciated basis in existing assets.
Cash spent on equipment or inventory, for example, would give rise to
a deduction, but existing basis in the equipment or inventory would
not be useable to offset sales. This divergence in treatment when
viewed with an income tax mindset appears inconsistent and unfair,
because it appears that basis has disappeared. As a result, any
proposal to shift to a subtraction VAT is generally accompanied by a
discussion of transition rules, which would permit businesses to use
their bases in existing assets to offset the amount of value added upon
which the VAT is imposed. Allowing a deduction or depreciation of
any remaining basis in trade or business property or allowing a
deduction for sales of inventory existing at the time of transition could
accomplish this.
A credit invoice method point of sale VAT raises the same issues
as a subtraction VAT and the solution to any perceived problem
would also operate similarly, but with credits instead of deductions.
Transition relief could treat remaining basis as a phantom purchase at
the time of transition upon which a VAT was charged. The phantom
VAT could be used as a credit against the VAT on the sale of the
finished product. An RST also involves these issues, but isolates them
to the retail level. Accordingly, the retailer could expect the same
kind of transition relief, if any, that would have been forthcoming
under a credit VAT.
Under any of the methods of permitting transition relief under an
indirect tax, the one-time wealth effect on businesses and their owners
of the consumption tax imposition would be moderated. A one-time
expected price increase resulting from the enactment, however, would
nevertheless occur, assuming accommodative monetary policy to
97
avoid unemployment brought on by wage stickiness.
Moreover,
97

See McNulty, supra note 25, at 2179, n.269 (noting that adoption of the VAT
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transition relief as described above would decrease revenues from the
new tax and thereby require higher tax rates than would be necessary
98
absent that transition relief. Those higher rates would magnify the
effects of the tax on consumption price levels and thereby reduce old
wealth, whose values were particularly sensitive and vulnerable to
99
price level increases.
C. Transition Relief Under Two-Tier Consumption Tax Proposals
Adjustments at the consumer/wage earner level should be
relatively easy under the two-tier consumption tax proposals. This is
because the two-tier proposals are essentially VAT systems, modified
to allow a deduction or credit to businesses for wages paid, thereby
shifting the legal incidence of the portion of the VAT imposed on
wages to the wage earner. As such, the transition to the new tax
would be easy, because the changes in tax collection mechanics would
be minor. Indeed, most wage earners would pay a tax very similar to
the tax paid under the income tax, although this tax would be
simplified, because it would include only wage income in the tax base.
Thus wage earners’ after-tax income would not be much different
than under the income tax, depending upon which two-tier proposal
was adopted and which tax rates were chosen.
At the business tax level, however, the same VAT transition
issues would arise with regard to unrecovered basis. As a result, the
same possible transition relief as discussed earlier would have to be
considered.
D. Transition Relief for Existing Wealth Under Yield Exemption Tax
In contrast to the other forms of consumption tax, one would
expect that a shift from an income tax to a yield exemption
consumption tax would advantage existing wealth, as discussed
earlier. It would therefore find favor among those who already
possess wealth and live off investment income. Retired people and
older workers would tend to fall into this category. From a transition
relief viewpoint, this result seems fair with regard to existing cash and
savings and investments in which a taxpayer has a basis, because tax

would likely cause a one-time price increase equal to the rate of the tax unless the tax
were moderated by transitional relief).
98
Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Revisions, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1419, 1456 (1996).
99
See generally id.
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has already been paid on these amounts when earned. The bonus to
yield exemption arises from taxpayers who own appreciated assets.
These taxpayers have enjoyed tax deferral under the income tax
regime on unrealized appreciation, and will never be taxed on those
amounts. The effective forgiveness of past-deferred tax gives yield
exemption a retroactive effect and a bonus to property owners that
varies with the amount of their built-up appreciation in their property.
Similarly, beneficiaries of deferred income under qualified plans
or other plans could also escape tax on those investments, unless these
deferred income amounts were viewed instead as earnings from
services subject to tax or become the subject of adverse transition
rules subjecting them to tax. Either of these alternatives appears both
fair and likely. Indeed, the contrast between yield exemption and the
other consumption tax models can best be illustrated and explained by
reference to the treatment of distributions from a qualified retirement
plan.
Absent a transition rule to the taxpayer’s detriment,
distributions from qualified retirement plans would also go untaxed
under a yield exemption system, even though earned under the
income tax regime and never subjected to tax previously. Under all of
the other consumption tax models, in contrast, distributions received
would be taxed if spent on personal consumption at the very least. It
is also possible that Congress would insist that they be subjected to tax
when received under a special rule that would apply the repealed
income tax to them, as might be done under yield exemption as well.
Presumably, as indicated above, budget shortfalls from the
adoption of a pure yield exemption tax would be made up by wage
earners and business owners (other than shareholders of C
corporations), who would continue to be taxed on their wage and
business income. These taxpayers could experience an increase in
their tax burdens. They would tend to be younger and middle aged
workers who have not yet entered into their high savings years.
E. Comparison of Effects of Transition Relief
An important observation about the contrast between the yield
exemption model and the other consumption tax models can be made
at this point. The difference in the consequences to wealth between a
yield exemption consumption tax and other methods of consumption
tax is not mandated by the choice, but rather lies in the transition to it.
For example, wealth created after the effective date following
enactment would have essentially similar treatment under all of the
methods. Under a consumed income tax, a taxpayer could avoid tax
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on that wealth by saving it. Similarly, under a VAT, a taxpayer could
avoid the tax by not spending it on consumption goods or services.
Finally, under a yield exemption tax, the taxpayer would avoid tax on
any earnings from the newly created wealth, which is an essentially
100
equivalent treatment.
On the other hand, under the likely forms of enactment (in their
pure forms) and absent transition relief, existing wealth will not share
equivalent treatment.
Under a cash flow consumed income
consumption tax, existing wealth in the form of property — when
converted to cash — will become subject to tax on its full value. Thus,
under a consumed income tax, wealth owners will lose the benefit of
their basis upon which they have already paid tax. Further, absent
transition relief, they would also lose the benefit of unrealized
appreciation of property upon sale if they consume the proceeds.
Moreover, even with the likely transition relief of being permitted to
avoid tax on existing basis, the unrealized appreciation will still be
subject to tax.
Similarly, a VAT would also subject the entire value of a business
property to tax when sold. Absent transition relief, previous
expenditures to the extent capitalized and as yet undepreciated will
also be subject to tax, because they will not offset sales proceeds of
the business. Further, the purchasing power for consumption goods
and services of individuals’ wealth will be devalued by the imposition
of the tax. Businesses may receive transition relief with regard to
their previously taxed basis, but it is unlikely that any transition relief
will be forthcoming to those whose wealth has been devalued by the
VAT generally.
The more favorable treatment of existing wealth under a yield
exemption consumption tax, however, is not dependent on transition
relief. Indeed, because there is already a yield exemption component
part of the existing income tax, any transition deviation from the yield
exemption method would be to limit its benefits, a very different
dynamic than transition relief. Absent such transition deviation,
appreciation that has occurred in the past would escape taxation, in
the same manner as would future appreciation. Existing wealth that
was created but not taxed under the income tax regime will never be
taxed, unless Congress acts to affirmatively tax it through a mark-tomarket approach to transition upon enactment, a very unlikely event.
Failure to tax this amount could be viewed as favoring existing wealth

100

See supra note 63 (comparing the consumed income model with the yield
exemption model using a numerical example).
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over future accumulations. It would shift the burden of funding
government onto future wage earners and businesses by means of
higher tax rates compared to what would be the case if the
appreciation that had escaped tax could be captured in the tax base.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS ON THE CHOICE OF
CONSUMPTION TAX
As explained above, the selection of the form of consumption tax
is as important as the decision to adopt a consumption tax. That is
because the effect on existing wealth can be quite different among the
alternative consumption tax regimes, particularly during the transition
period, depending upon the transition relief that is enacted. While
there is disagreement as to the magnitude of the differing effects on
old wealth that would result from the adoption of the various of
consumption tax alternatives and likely transition rules that would be
enacted, there should be agreement that yield exemption will be
kinder to existing wealth than either form of VAT, RST, or a
consumed income tax. Both theory and practical political analysis
support the view that it will be far kinder.
The implications of the foregoing conclusions are immense. They
include class warfare and intergenerational issues; the adverse effect
on activities that currently enjoy tax advantages; the likely fight over
transition relief; grandfather rules and phase-ins, with their
consequential higher tax rates to make up for the resulting revenue
shortfall; and, importantly, the recognition that there is a substantial
impediment to reaching what may be the most efficient tax system.
These will be discussed in turn.
A. Class and Intergenerational Warfare
Class warfare is generally defined in terms of wealth, but could
also be defined in terms of income or consumption spending, which
may or may not draw different dividing lines than wealth. With
regard to the choice of consumption tax, wealth would seem to be the
most likely source of division. As explained earlier, the consumed
income and VAT consumption taxes disadvantage wealth. They
should therefore reduce wealth differences, because they
disadvantage existing wealth by reducing its purchasing power of
101
consumption goods and services.
Yield exemption, on the other
101

Interestingly, since wealth and high income are closely associated, they also
result in greater progressivity than yield exemption. Gentry & Hubbard, supra note
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hand, advantages existing wealth and therefore likely enhances wealth
differences.
Wealth itself, however, would not be the only cause of division.
Earning power from labor would also be a divide. Those who have
the ability to earn money from their work, which would not be taxed
unless spent under a consumed income regime, VAT, or two-tier
consumption tax regime, might view the benefit of tax-free income as
outweighing the detriment of eroded wealth that can be spent on
consumption. Retired people or those living off invested capital, on
the other hand, likely would view these forms of consumption tax with
hostility. Indeed, they would be more likely to sense the unfairness of
double taxing savings amounts on which income tax had already been
102
paid,
unless extensive transition relief for existing wealth
103
accompanied the change.
Social security recipients, who, in a sense, are living off
accumulated wealth in the form of a government promise of their
social security pensions, which can be valued in present value terms,
may be most hostile, because they have the smallest cushion to the
change. Adjustments might have to be made in social security benefit
payments similar to the indexing of social security payments with the
wage index. As one can see, a shift to these forms of consumption tax
without a lengthy transition would face a difficult political battle.
In contrast, the battle would be quite different if the consumption
tax that was adopted were a yield exemption form. In that case, the
wealthy and retirees would have little reason to object to the shift, and
the complaining parties would be those taxpayers who were required
to make up the revenue shortfall through higher taxes on wage or
business income. The potential harm to those people would be
speculative, depending upon future legislative measures to raise
28, at 24–26.
102
See id. at 10–11. However, Gentry and Hubbard also note that if corporate
stock prices increase because of the elimination of the tax on corporate dividends and
capital gains, the elderly are likely to also benefit disproportionately because of their
disproportionately large share of ownership of those assets. Id. at 17. On the other
hand, they would be net losers from the resultant devaluation of tax exempt bonds, of
which as a class they own a disproportionately large amount. Id. at 18.
103
See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28, at 372 (noting the importance of
transition relief for existing wealth on the welfare of the elderly: see also M. Kevin
McGee, Alternative Transitions to a Consumption Tax, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 155, 155–56
(1989) (observing a likely dramatic and inequitable welfare loss to the elderly from a
shift to a VAT, which could be ameliorated by employing a “personal expenditure
tax” — a consumed income tax with a transition relief exclusion for existing wealth by
permitting that wealth yield exemption treatment).
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revenue. Among taxpayers and Congressmen, hope and self-delusion
about tax increases can generally be relied upon to obfuscate any
otherwise foreseeable future tax increases, notwithstanding Ricardo’s
assertion that expected future tax will be taken into account by
104
current taxpayers.
B. Effect on Tax-Advantaged Activities
A shift from the current income tax to a consumption tax in any
of the various forms would also affect certain currently taxadvantaged activities. This could occur through the elimination of the
advantage, such as by the effective elimination of any charitable
contribution tax benefit to an individual under a VAT, because the
legal incidence of the VAT is on businesses and not individual
taxpayers. It could also occur by virtue of the leveling of the playing
field under a consumption tax, such as by eliminating the tax
advantage of life insurance under a yield exemption tax, because all
investments would enjoy the advantage of inside build-up, now
reserved for life insurance company products. Similarly, traditional
retirement savings special benefits would be eliminated under a
consumed income tax, under which all savings enjoy a deduction. If
special incentives were desired for certain activities, they could be
tailored to the type of tax involved. But, presumably, one reason for
the adoption of a new taxing system would be to eliminate all or most
of this special treatment.
The elimination of special treatment of certain investments could
have an effect on the value of those investments. Owner occupied
housing is perhaps the most important example. The shift from an
income tax to a consumption tax could involve a reduction in the
value of home prices resulting from the effective elimination of the tax
subsidy of deductible home mortgage interest. Home ownership
already enjoys the tax benefits of non-taxability of imputed income
from the use of the home and excludability from income of all or most
105
of the gain on the sale of the home (for most taxpayers); these

104

DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION ch. 29 (John Murray ed., 3d ed. 1821). Ricardo’s assertion (known as
“Ricardian Equivalence”) posits that consumers characterize government borrowing
as a future tax liability.
105
Section 121, which contains qualification requirements, limits the scope, in
general, to a home used by the taxpayer as her principal residence for two to five
years prior to the sale and limits the benefit to $250,000 of excludible gain for a single
individual and $500,000 of excludible gain for a married couple. I.R.C. § 121(a)–(b).
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would continue (or even be enhanced) under a yield exemption tax
system or current legislative iterations of the other consumption tax
methods. Under all consumption tax methods, however, tax benefits
for home mortgage interest, such as a deduction under a consumed
income tax or exclusion from VAT, would not be allowed, unless the
subsidy was somehow retained. This phenomenon would create
downward pressure on home prices, unless interest rates declined
106
correspondingly.
Robert Hall has suggested that the subsidy could be retained
under his two-tier “Flat Tax,” by designating existing mortgages
eligible for transition relief, which would entail continuing to allow a
deduction for interest but requiring the lender to continue to include
the interest in income. Post-enactment mortgages also could continue
this treatment or, alternatively, neither permit a deduction nor require
107
inclusion, in which event they would carry a lower interest rate.
Any replacement tax system would have to deal with the destabilizing
effect to many people of a change that could reduce the value, or
increase the carrying cost, of this investment.
Most of the proposals in the political arena have retained or
created special rules for home mortgage interest. This demonstrates
that regardless of the system chosen to replace the current income tax,
transition rules are possible to protect the politically untouchable, but
at the cost of retaining the current tax system’s inefficiencies.
C. The Fight Over Transition
Wholesale transition to a VAT or consumed income tax would be
destabilizing and perceived as unfair, regardless of the form in which
it is implemented — consumed income tax VAT, or two-tier
consumption tax. Those who have paid tax on previous earnings, but
will be required to pay tax again when their after-tax saved earnings
are spent on consumption, will view the result as unfair double
taxation. They will perceive it as unfair that recently purchased assets

106

See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28 at 362, who discuss this likely effect in
the context of a consumed income tax, because it would change the relative prices of
assets that are now receiving disparate treatment under the income tax. But see
Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 28, at 43–45 (suggesting that other factors such as
lower interest rates could cause house prices to increase or would blunt any decrease,
so that no simple conclusions are possible).
107
Robert E. Hall, Guidelines for Tax Reform: The Simple, Progressive ValueAdded Consumption Tax, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 70, 78–79 (Alan
J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005).
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or cash will fare no better under the replacement system than
appreciated assets or deferred retirement plan distributions, on which
no tax has previously been imposed.
These objections can be dealt with through transition and
grandfather rules. As explained earlier, previously taxed income in
the form of basis in property can be allowed as a deduction or be
treated as depreciable under a subtraction method VAT or can give
rise to a phantom credit under a credit invoice VAT. Similarly, under
a consumed income tax, basis can be allowed to offset amount
realized in computing gross income, from which savings can then be
deducted in arriving at the consumed income tax base. Arguably,
anti-abuse rules would also be required in this latter situation to
ensure that wealthy taxpayers are not able to turn over all of their
investments to achieve a deduction for all of their bases in their assets,
which would not be available if they had simply retained those assets.
In addition, announcing a shift to a consumption tax could stop
transactions during the hiatus between the announcement and the
effective date. For example, if a subtraction VAT were announced, to
be effective at a future time, prospective purchasers could defer their
purchases until the VAT became effective, so as not to lose the
benefit of their basis in the purchased goods. Waiting would entitle
the purchaser to an immediate deduction.
Of course, in some cases the disadvantage to the buyer in
purchasing before the effective date would be offset by the advantage
to the seller of that timing, allowing the seller to offset gain by the
basis in the item sold. In those cases, impending law change would
largely cause a reduction in price to the buyer to take account of the
effects on buyer and seller. But, one would also expect the impending
change to retard production in situations in which there is no seller
offset to the buyer’s disadvantage of purchasing before the effective
date. Moreover, both parties would have to take into account the risk
of non-enactment in the period between the proposal of the change
and enactment.
Similarly, transactions that are crossing the transom when the
enactment becomes effective not only raise issues of equity and
wealth destruction, but also invite harmful speculation by prospective
purchasers, who will make purchase decisions based on tax
considerations instead of business needs. Permutations include the
treatment of contracts for sale of goods or services for which prices
are set, which are entered into under the income tax regime but
performed under the VAT regime; the treatment of construction
projects begun before the effective date but completed after; and

GOLDBERG_FORMATTED.4.DOC

484

4/22/2007 9:53 AM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:447

similar long-running transactions. These kinds of transaction issues,
however, are not different from changes occurring within the income
tax as a matter of course on what has become a regular basis, at a time
when similar types of long-running transactions are in progress. These
transition issues in and of themselves should not present an
insurmountable impediment to a shift. In that sense, they pale in
comparison to the more important wealth reduction impact of any
shift to a VAT, consumed income, or two-tier consumption tax, which
could make such a shift difficult from a political point of view. They
do, however, augment the obstacles to change that are already present
and therefore need to be confronted.
On the flip side, excluding previously untaxed qualified
retirement plan distributions from the tax base in any of these
alternative systems would cause those systems to be retroactive in
effect, because they would not attempt to tax income that was actually
earned under the replaced income tax regime. As such, the
consumption tax regime would seem to be unduly favorable to those
individuals. A similar argument can be made with regard to
unrealized appreciation, which perhaps should be taxable upon
conversion to the new system, although the literature does not appear
to deal with this latter possibility.
Any transition relief will necessarily result in higher tax rates
under the substitute system than would be needed in the absence of
such relief in order to compensate for the revenue lost from not taxing
capital. Disincentives resulting from high tax rates would be
magnified as a result and new investment could be adversely affected.
On the other hand, instituting a consumption tax system (other than a
yield exemption system) without transition relief would reduce
individual wealth available for consumption, as discussed earlier, but
may thereby create additional incentives to work and save in order to
restore that wealth.
One solution to the transition problem resulting from a shift to a
consumption tax that is not a yield exemption system is gradual
change. A direct or indirect consumption tax could be phased in over
several years, accompanied by a promise of upwardly adjusting social
security benefits tied, as they are today, to a wage index, but also to
the increased tax-inclusive cost of goods, as would likely be the case
under a VAT. This gradual approach would be taken at the cost of
108
greater complexity.
Further, retirees who are beneficiaries of taxable pensions or
108

Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 28, at 367.
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401(k) and similar defined contribution retirement accounts could be
assuaged by allowing those account payments to be received at
reduced income tax rates or even tax-free, because they would bear
the consumption tax when spent. But, this transition relief may overcompensate those who perceive a disadvantage from the change to the
extent that they can continue to accumulate in this tax advantaged
way and defer consumption.
Ultimately, there will be a stock of existing wealth that has been
accumulated on an after income tax basis that will bear the burden of
the shift. To the extent that certain types of wealth are carved out
from the burden-bearing wealth through special transition rules,
existing wealth that does not fall into a favored category will have to
absorb an even greater burden if revenue shortfalls are to be avoided.
As Sarkar and Zodrow point out, gains and losses from the transition
will be essentially “arbitrary and capricious,” and therefore
inequitable to the extent that the existing tax has been in effect for a
long time; thus current “windfall losses” are not merely reversing
previous “windfall gains,” and the tax reform that is enacted is largely
109
unexpected, so that it is not already reflected in asset prices.
Moreover, this perception is likely to be magnified, in their view, if
gains from reform are widely distributed but losses are highly
110
concentrated.
It seems unlikely that any mix of transition relief,
grandfather rules, and phase-ins can satisfy all constituencies, and the
results of the political battles may very well not yield an objectively
determined best solution.
D. Recent and Proposed Income Tax Changes as an Impediment to
Change
One can discuss fundamental tax reform in academic and
aspirational terms, but ultimately, the process of tax reform is a
political process. Those who perceive themselves as losers in the
change will act to block the change. When the losers are wealthy, the
political power they can exercise will likely be out of proportion to
their numbers. When they are retirees or soon-to-be retirees, who are
well organized, they are also apt to have political power greater than
their numbers. These forces combined provide a formidable force for
the proponents of change to overcome. Gradual change and
transition relief will likely be required to overcome these forces.

109
110

Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
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The magnitude of these forces will likely be greater than they
were twenty years ago during the last attempt at genuine tax reform in
1986. Since that time, many full or partial yield exemption provisions
have been added to the Code to create a truly hybrid tax system.
Moving from a yield exemption system which, from a pure income tax
perspective, unduly favors existing wealth, to one that punishes it,
presents a step that may now be too great to make by legislative fiat.
Transition relief may be inescapable if the attempt to make the step,
indeed the leap, has a realistic chance of success.
Thus, it is tempting to approach fundamental tax reform in terms
of income tax versus consumption tax and the resulting winners and
losers from any such shift. That narrow focus, however, misses the
real struggle and particularly misperceives the interests that have
grown around the yield exemption elements of the current tax, such as
the non-taxation of unrealized appreciation, special tax rates for
dividends and capital gains, and Roth-type retirement or savings
benefits both currently in the law and proposed. Indeed, wealthy
consumption tax advocates may prefer a yield exemption hybrid to a
direct or indirect pure consumption tax; as a result, they could oppose
such a shift in the interests of the status quo, as expanded by
Retirement Savings Accounts (RSA) and Lifetime Savings Accounts
111
(LSA) recently proposed by the Bush Administration.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Transition to a consumption tax (other than yield exemption) may
require a gradual approach, both as a matter of equity, perceived and
real, and practicality. Accordingly, as a conceptual matter, transition
would have to be accomplished through interim steps. For example,
one could speculate about a transition to a two-tier credit invoice
VAT, modified by an allowance of a deduction for wages while taxing
those wages to workers (the E Tax discussed earlier), with scheduled
annual increases over five to seven years. As the new tax is phased in,
the income tax would be adjusted downward simultaneously by
reducing the tax rates on individual income (other than wages) and on
businesses across the board by the same number of percentage points
by which the VAT is increased. The phase-out would create a zero
111

See Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax, supra note 1, at 14–15 n.70 (“The
Bush Treasury Proposal would have both simplified and expanded individual
retirement arrangements by replacing traditional, Roth, and nondeductible IRAs with
Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) and would have permitted other kinds of tax
advantaged savings through Lifetime Savings Accounts (LSAs).”).
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bracket amount in the income tax (other than for wages) and for
businesses that would be enlarged as the years passed and the VAT
was fully phased in. In effect, this latter change would, during the five
to seven year transition period, permit taxpayers to adjust to the
gradual wealth destruction effect of the VAT. Ultimately, after the
phase-in period has been completed, there would be a two-tier
consumption tax in the form of the E Tax and the adverse effect on
those living off existing wealth would have occurred gradually. The
pain, however, would be spread over more and younger people.
A gradual approach could be devised in similar fashion to apply
to the cash flow consumed income form of consumption tax, other
VAT systems, and the combinations and variations of these forms
such as the USA Tax, the Flat Tax, and the X Tax, respectively.
The forces of reform, however, may be working against any shift
to a consumption tax (other than yield exemption) even with
transition relief in the form of gradual phase-in. As the income tax
gradually becomes a yield exemption wage and business tax, existing
wealth owners may view the consumption tax battle as having already
been won without cost and without the need to make compromises.
Possessors of existing wealth may be reluctant to support an
alternative consumption tax system that would erode the consumption
purchasing power of some of their wealth. Reform in other
consumption tax directions may then be elusive, because it would lack
the group that would be its natural supporters.
On the other hand, income tax defenders who have less wealth
may see a consumed income or VAT consumption tax as the lesser of
evils and indeed a positive reform from a wage tax, which the income
tax is inextricably approaching. That is because the enactment of a
consumed income tax and consumption VAT in effect imposes a onetime implicit tax on existing wealth (which is equivalent to a tax on the
112
present value of the future income stream from capital ) and thereby
makes the consumption tax progressive (or at least less regressive) in
income tax terms. As a result, a VAT or two-tier consumption tax
may have a larger constituency than it would have had ten or twenty
years ago, when the tax system was more of an income tax than it has
since become and particularly than where it appears to be headed.

112

David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, Symposium on Wealth Taxes Part II: A
Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499, 513, 525 (2000).
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APPENDIX
The effect of a consumed income tax on existing wealth can be
illustrated by using a simple numerical example. Assume two sellers,
Manufacturer M, who manufactures widgets and sells them at
wholesale for $56, and Retailer R, who buys them from M and resells
them at retail to the ultimate consumer, C, for $80. Assume also that
those are the only sales that M and R engage in during the year. M
pays wages of $40 to Employee W. R pays no wages. In addition,
assume that sellers can pass any cost or tax increase to their customers
and no party is able to pass any cost or tax increase back to factors of
production. Further, assume that the imposition of taxes has no effect
on demand or supply of any products or labor, so that the full amount
of the tax must be internalized by the taxpayer upon whom the legal
incidence of the tax is imposed, which will be reflected in its prices to
customers. Also, assume that wages in terms of dollars (i.e., nominal
wages), can never decline as a result of tax changes or any other
economic changes (the assumption of “wage stickiness”) and that the
money supply is allowed to increase just enough to reflect higher
costs, so that the policies under discussion are not affected by either
inflationary or deflationary biases. Initially, assume that all of C’s
wealth is held in the form of cash. (The analysis will ignore the effects
on the economy from any imposition of the new tax, as in Example 1,
or any overall tax reduction that could result from the shift to a
consumption tax using the same tax rate, as in Example 2. It will also
ignore any business level income tax in order to simplify the numerical
analysis).
Example 1. Consider first the enactment of a consumed income
tax at the tax inclusive rate of 20% in an otherwise tax-free economy.
Upon C’s purchase of R’s product for $80, C would be subject to a tax
equal to $20 (20% * $100). This would be the case even if the entire
$100 were derived from C’s savings. Thus, C’s wealth would have
suffered a devaluation of 20% in that what used to be purchasable for
$80 of wealth would now exhaust $100 of wealth. The new consumed
income tax would have effectively caused a $20 diminution in C’s
wealth.
The effect of a subtraction method VAT, credit VAT, and retail
sales tax on existing wealth can be illustrated by the above numerical
example also. Assume the enactment of a subtraction method VAT
at a tax inclusive rate of 20%. Under the simplifying assumptions
stated above, the price charged by R will increase by $20, so that R
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will sell its product for $100 instead of $80. 80% of the price, or $80,
will be retained by R and 20%, or $20 will be paid by R and its
suppliers in tax. In particular, M. who previously was willing to sell its
product for $56 will build its tax of $14 (20% * ($56 + $14)) into its
price to R. R, in turn, who previously was willing to sell its product
for $80 when it purchased it at wholesale for $56, will now sell it for
$100. R will pay M $70, retain its profit of $24, and build in its tax on
that profit of $6. The $6 tax (20% * ($100 – $70)) will be paid out of
the $30 spread, leaving the $24 profit intact. Under that scenario, C
will have to pay $100 for goods that he could have formerly purchased
for $80. Thus, C’s wealth would have suffered diminution of $20 and a
devaluation of 20% ($100 – $80). A credit VAT and RST will operate
in the same manner. This is the same effect on wealth as under the
consumed income tax, but via a different mechanism.
Finally, the enactment of a two-tier consumption tax, in which
both business and labor are subject to a flat tax-inclusive 20% tax, will
affect prices in the same manner as other forms of VAT and the RST,
with yet a slightly different mechanism. The full 20% tax will be
imposed directly on W. Thus, W will incur a tax of $10 (20% * ($40 +
$10), which he will pass on to his employer under the assumptions of
the example by demanding a wage increase from $40 to $50. M’s
business tax will be computed by subtracting $50 from its wholesale
selling price of $70. This $70 builds W’s passed-though $10 tax into
M’s wholesale price, which becomes $66 instead of $56, and includes
M’s own tax of $4 (20% * ($70 – $50)). Thus, the resulting tax to M
will be $4 instead of $14, as under a pure subtraction VAT. Together,
W and M will pay combined tax of $14, the same as under a pure
subtraction VAT.
R will incur a tax of $6, computed as (20% * ($100 – $70), and will
sell its product for $100. In essence, R’s retail price to C adds the
aggregate taxes of W ($10) and M ($4), which are embedded in M’s
wholesale price to R, and R ($6), and R’s pre-tax price of $80. Again,
the net effect of the two-tier tax would be to increase price levels by
the tax to $100. It would thereby devalue C’s wealth by that amount.
It now costs C $100 to purchase what used to cost $80, representing a
20% devaluation of wealth (($100 – $80)/100). Table 1 sets forth these
results.
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TABLE I. IMPOSITION OF CONSUMPTION TAX ON A TAX-FREE
ECONOMY
Reduction in
Method of

Beginning

tax

wealth

Tax imposed

Consumable

upon use for

wealth after

consumption

direct tax on C

consumable
Price

wealth after

increase

direct tax and
price
adjustment

Consumed
income

100

20

80

0

20

100

0

100

20

20

100

0

100

20

20

Subtraction
method VAT
(credit VAT)
Two-tier tax

Example 2. Consider now the effects on existing wealth if the
various forms of consumption tax replaced an individual income tax
instead of being imposed on a tax-free economy as in the previous
examples. Assume the former tax inclusive income tax rate is also
20% and that W earns a gross amount of $50, so that his net after-tax
earnings is $40. Under a consumed income tax, the wealth reduction
effect would be exactly the same as in the previous example. Wealth
shifted to consumption would now be subject to the 20% tax. C
would exhaust $100 of wealth to purchase R’s product, which
previously cost him $80. He would thereby suffer reduced purchasing
power of $20 and his wealth would be devalued by 20%.
Similarly, under a VAT, the cost of goods would increase by the
amount of the tax (keeping with the assumption in the example of
taxes being passed forward to customers). W, who previously earned
$50, and therefore $40 after tax, before the replacement of the income
tax, would now have the entire $50 available to spend on
consumption, a $10 increase in nominal spending capacity.
Consumption products, however, would now cost $112 instead of $80.
That is because M would continue to earn its previous profit of $16 by
selling its product at a wholesale price of $82 out of which it would
pay W’s wages of $50 and its VAT of $16. R would continue to earn
its $24 net amount after tax, but would have to pay out of its $112
sales proceeds (1) $82 to M and (2) $6 of VAT, for total payments by
R of $88. Thus, the effective increase in wages would be reflected in
the product price paid by C, which would increase from $100 to $112.
Existing wealth, therefore, would have suffered a loss in nominal
purchasing power of $32. What previously cost $80 would now cost
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$112, thereby devaluing existing wealth. However, $12 of the $32
price increase experienced by C will be the result of a one-time
inflationary effect. That is, the cost increase resulting purely from the
imposition of the tax will be $20 and the $12 portion of the increase
reflects the increased cost of labor, which would not bear any tax
directly, but would not suffer any reduction because of the
phenomenon of wage stickiness that was assumed. This occurs
because the tax on labor was paid by the employers without reducing
the overall cost of the labor.
In a fully adjustable economy (without wage stickiness), it would
be expected that the elimination of the income tax would cause wages
to decline to $40 from $50, allowing the “after-tax” wage amount to
remain the same. Our basic assumption of wage-stickiness, however,
precluded this from occurring. As indicated in the previous set of
examples, a credit VAT and RST would have this same effect.
The two-tier consumption tax, however, permits an easier
adjustment for the economy. By imposing the legal incidence of the
portion of the VAT attributable to wages on W instead of M, the twotier consumption tax permits the wage-earner, W, to be unaffected by
the shift from income tax to a consumption tax. That is because W’s
after-tax wage income will be $40 both under the income tax and the
replacement consumption tax. But, M’s VAT will be $4 (20% * ($70 –
$50)) instead of $14 (20% * $70) as under a pure VAT. The aggregate
tax on W and M will remain at $14, which will be passed through to R.
R will bear a tax cost of $6 as before and will resell its product for
$100, which will include the original $80 plus $20 in aggregate “new”
taxes. Table 2 sets forth these results.
TABLE II. IMPOSITION OF CONSUMPTION TAX AS A REPLACEMENT
FOR AN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
Reduction in
Method of

Beginning

tax

wealth

Tax imposed

Consumable

upon use for

wealth after

consumption

direct tax on C

consumable
Price

wealth after

increase

direct tax and
price
adjustment

Consumed
income

100

20

80

0

20

100

0

100

32

32

100

0

100

20

20

Subtraction
method VAT
(credit VAT)
Two-tier tax
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Thus, C’s cash endowment, which will be spent on consumption,
will be devalued to a lesser extent under the two-tier tax than under a
VAT or RST, because the devaluation will not reflect any general
one-time inflationary price increase resulting from W’s effective relief
from income tax responsibility, which will be borne by M and passed
along ultimately to C in addition to other taxes.

